

RETHINKING THE DIGITAL COMPETITION BILL IN INDIA

Sharbani Mohapatra

Masters of Laws

Symbiosis Law School, Hyderabad

ABSTRACT

India's digital economy has seen an unprecedented rise in online platforms and digital services which resulted in new competition challenges that the traditional Competition Act, 2002 struggles to address. The proposed Digital Competition Bill (DCB) looked to introduce an ex-ante regulatory framework aimed at preventing anti-competitive conduct before it occurs. Drawing inspiration from the European Union's Digital Markets Act and the United Kingdom's Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act, the Bill proposed the designation of Systemically Significant Digital Enterprises (SSDEs) and their Associated Digital Enterprises (ADEs) to regulate core digital services such as search engines, app stores, and social media. However, the Bill faced significant resistance from industry stakeholders, who criticized its subjective thresholds, potential misuse, and lack of clarity in showing SSDEs. Consequently, the government withdrew the draft, opting to design a framework more suitable to India's unique digital ecosystem.

This paper traces the historical evolution of competition law in India—from the MRTP Act, 1969 to the Competition Act, 2002—and critically examines the need for specialized digital competition legislation. It also offers a comparative perspective with global regimes and evaluates the implications of adopting an ex-ante model in India. The study concludes that while India urgently needs a regulatory framework tailored to its digital economy, such a law must be context-specific, balanced, and designed to foster innovation alongside fair competition.

Keywords: Digital Competition Bill, Ex-ante Regulation, Systemically Significant Digital Enterprises (SSDEs), Competition Law in India, Digital Markets Act (DMA).

INTRODUCTION

With close to half a billion or more internet subscribers, India has officially become one of the 'largest and fastest-growing markets' for the digital consumer base. This adoption or transition towards digitization is likely to create two major things: firstly, it would bring economic value of significance, and secondly, change the nature of jobs of millions in the workforce. This drive has been plausible because of the public sector's active involvement in giving a digital identity to its citizens through the Aadhar program, which has enrolled over a billion people since the time it was introduced. On the other hand, the private sector has also acted as a catalyst by helping consumers gain the accessibility to the internet.¹

This accessibility to the internet helped the digital economy make progress and expand rapidly, but the existing framework was not enough to cover the unique and dynamic changes that our digital markets faced. The competition has risen due to an increase in e-commerce platforms, and this has exposed a lot of gaps in the framework that existed. In response to this shortcoming, the Government of India proposed a separate legislation dedicated to regulating competition in the digital economy. Also, due to the dominance or very strong influence of the digital platforms in the market, practices like that of predatory pricing, exclusive agreements, and manipulation of the search results usually exclude market competitors and limit the choice of the consumer in the end. Further, integration of the ad-tech supply chain leads to dominant players leveraging unfair advertising policies, which gives them a greater edge. Thus, this bill seeks to address anti-steering practices, neutrality on platforms, tying and bundling, and personal data exploitation.² The necessity for such a bill was more evident by virtue of cases such as *MakeMyTrip Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. V. Competition Commission of India*,³ wherein platforms like MakeMyTrip and Golbibo were found to have used exclusivity clauses, and went on to delist competitors such as Treebo and FabHotels. When this act was brought to the notice of the Competition Commission, the commission took immediate action by imposing penalties and ordering reinstatement.

¹ Noshir Kaka et al., *Digital India: Technology to Transform a Connected Nation*, McKinsey & Co. (Sept. 11, 2025, 9:30 PM), https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/mckinsey-digital/our-insights/digital-india-technology-to-transform-a-connected-nation?utm_source=chatgpt.com#section-header-5.

² *Why India Needs a Digital Competition Bill*, Kings & Alliance LLP, <https://knallp.com/why-india-needs-a-digital-competition-bill/> (last visited Sept. 11, 2025).

³ *MakeMyTrip Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. Competition Commission of India*, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 4440.

Further, in the case of *Google LLC V. Competition Commission of India*,⁴ Google had made an unnecessary pre-installation criterion of its services in every Android operating system. This pre-installation again limited the consumer's choices to choose freely, and also affected the market competition in the digital space. CCI imposed remedies such as allowing "Original Equipment Manufacturers" (OEMs) to have a choice to choose apps that they would like to pre-install. Thus, this way, even the end users would have an option of selecting their default search engine. The competition has always been harmed, and thus, a need for the Digital Competition Act was seen.

EMERGENCE OF COMPETITION LAWS IN INDIA

The Competition Act, before becoming the Competition Act, was first introduced as the 'Monopolistic and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 (MRTP)'. Later, the name and the aims and objectives of the act were changed, and reintroduced as the Competition Act in the year 2002. The MRTP, 1969, and the Competition Act, 2002, were the backbone legislation for a healthy market. It also played a major role in the liberalization of the economy and had direct control over the dominant players of the market.⁵

The Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969

There were three major reports whose observations shaped the way the MRTP Act was introduced, and they are:

1. The 'Hazari Committee Report' (Industrial Licensing Procedure)
2. 'Mahalanobis Committee Report' ('Distribution and Levels of Income')
3. 'Monopolies Inquiry Commission Report' by 'Das Gupta'

The observations made under these reports were that the states have shown an inclination towards entrepreneurs who are wealthy and influential while granting Industrial Licenses. This inclination or bias towards the wealthy entrepreneurs resulted in an uneven growth of the industry (Hazari Committee Report). Next, it was observed that a huge chunk of money was mainly handled by a few influential people, and again, the design of the economic model suited successful industrialists only (Mahalanobis).

⁴ *Google LLC v. Competition Commission of India*, 2023 SCC OnLine NCLAT 147.

⁵ Nisha Gera & Neha Junega, *Evolution of Competition Law and Policy in India*, <https://ebooks.inflibnet.ac.in/lawp05/chapter/evolution-of-competition-law-and-policy-in-india/> (last visited Sept. 11, 2025, 12:30 PM).

Lastly, it was observed in the report that only a few commercial hubs were vested with most of the economic power, and monopolistic trade was a widespread practice in the economy.⁶

After viewing all the problems, hindrances in the market (from the side of the state), and a legal system that is soft in nature, the Monopolies Inquiry Commission (MIC) went on to draft a bill. The bill later came to be known as the 'Monopolistic Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969', and came into force by the year 1970. This Act was in direct congruence with the "Directive Principles of State Policy" of India.⁷

The major objectives of the MRTP Act were:⁸

1. The prices were unreasonable
2. There was no free market, as the competition was very restrictive
3. There were limitations on the development, "technically and economically limitations imposed on production and supply"
4. The profits that were made in the market were quite unreasonable

There were two major amendments made to the act in the years 1984 and 1991 to develop the act in a way that it can adapt to the ever-changing dynamic market.

Legal precedents supporting the same are:

1. Registrar of Restrictive Trade V. Bata India Ltd.⁹

Bata, under this case, was a 'dominant entity' in the Indian 'footwear market'. It was known for 'manufacturing different kinds of footwear'. The poor 'manufacturers' often comprised the 'cobblers and other manufacturers' of a smaller scale. But the twist here was that they had entered into agreements, and the agreements restricted them to buy the soles and other required amenities only from the vendors that Bata had approved. After this act was caught, the MRTP Commission opined that the acts of bata are construed to be those of a restrictive and monopolistic nature. Further, the commission stated that such actions are not only harmful for the market players but also, they are detrimental to society.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Business Law – Competition Law, Scribd, <https://www.scribd.com/document/455403419/business-law-competition-law> (last visited Sept. 12, 2025).

⁹ Registrar of Restrictive Trade v. Bata India Ltd., (1976) 46 Comp. Cas. 41.

2. Modern Food Industries¹⁰

This case is related to predatory pricing in the market. The Modern Food Industries was involved in manufacturing bakery items. To become a dominant player in the market, they started selling bread at lower costs, which was lower than the manufacturing cost of the bread. They employed this method to restrict and eliminate consumers in the market. This was considered to be a monopolistic practice, and the commission took cognizance of the same.

The Competition Act, 2002

The face of market competition started changing, and the old MRTP was no longer able to serve the purpose of just restricting market competition or practicing monopolistic practices. Thus, India had to adopt a new 'competition policy' where the 'objective shifted' from 'preventing monopolies' to promoting 'free competition' in the 'market'.

This new act aimed not only to negate the bad effects on the competition but also targeted towards foster healthy competitive behaviour. This act was a major advocate for freedom of trade amongst all the market players. The new act conforms to the modern-day requirements and market structure. The three major areas are:¹¹

1. Anti-Competitive Behaviour ("between the firms")
2. Abuse of Dominant Position
3. Combinations ("Mergers and Acquisitions")

Anti-Competitive Behaviour

The Competition Act, 2002, is very strict when it comes to declaring any agreement void due to the "Appreciable Adverse Effect on Competition" (AAEC) that it puts. Any such agreement that is inclusive of an arrangement, or an understanding, or any such concerted action due to the meeting of minds in any form, be it oral or written, is strictly viewed under this act. Different agreements fall under this category, which are known as vertical and horizontal agreements. The horizontal agreements involve practices such as collusion, bid-rigging, limiting the supply in the market, and fixation of prices.

¹⁰ Modern Food Indus. Case, (1996) 3 Comp. L.J. 154.

¹¹ Soumi Bandyopadhyay, From MRTP to Competition Act: An Evolution of Competition Laws in India, 2 J. Legal & Reg. Just. Stud. 1027, 1027–28.

Then there is cartelization, which is known to be the most harmful form of collusive act.¹²

Abuse of Dominant Position

The Competition Act never deemed that a dominant position is per se bad. But abusing or leveraging such dominance in the market is wrong, as the act does not give any rights to the dominant players to abuse their dominance to enter the market or earn profits. To determine the abuse of dominance in the market three-fold test has been provided.¹³

- a. Relevant market being defined
- b. Assessment of dominance in the relevant market that is demarcated and defined
- c. Establishing that abuse of dominance has happened

Combinations

The term combination means when there is a merger, amalgamation, or acquisition of control, shares, rights of voting, etc. The combination comes into play when the above-mentioned actions meet the thresholds that have been laid down under the act. The aim of bringing in this legislation is to regulate every such combination that might cause an 'Appreciable Adverse Effect on Competition'. This provision under the act is of the nature of ex-ante regulation. The thresholds are set before they can cause AAEC. This law requires that every such action that meets the thresholds notify the CCI immediately.¹⁴

Landmark cases under this Act:

Belaire owner's association Vs. DLF¹⁵

Here, the case was concerned with the abuse dominant position by DLF Ltd., a very well-known company in the real estate. They imposed unfair restraints on the customers and made unilateral decisions. They decided to increase the size of the building without consulting the stakeholders of the building, which are the customers

¹² Ashok Chawla, *Global Business and Competition Law in India*, 9 Int'l Fin. & Acct. J. 173, 174–77 (2014).

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ *Belaire Owners' Ass'n v. DLF Ltd.*, 2011 Comp. L.R. 239.

or flat owners. Thus, when the CCI was tasked to look into the case, it went on to impose a 'penalty of 124 million' dollars at the 'rate of 7% of the average turnover of the company for the last three preceding' years. It further stated that apart from market competition, consumer welfare is also of utmost priority.

A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO THE DIGITAL COMPETITION BILL (DCB), 2019

In June of 2022, the Standing Committee of the Parliament on Commerce issued a report that proposed an ex-ante regulation regime which would deal with the issues arising out of the digital marketplace. A need for modifications to the Competition Act 2002 was also highlighted, which the Competition Law Review Committee had already proposed in their report in July 2019. The Standing Committee of Parliament on Finance issued a detailed study on Big Techs that indulge in anti-competitive practices and strongly advocated for an ex-ante regulation to promote a fairer and more transparent digital marketplace in India. This was promoted via a new Digital Competition Act (DCA).¹⁶

Since the year 2016, around the world about more than 30 competition authorities have published reports on various competition policies in the digitalized era. Out of these '30 reports', 4 reports in particular were seen to be significant. These were not just confined to the digital platforms but had an analysis done using a wider ambit and recommendations. The reports are: 1) "Report by the Committee for the Study of Digital Platforms by the University of Chicago Booth School of Business", 2) "Competition Policy for the Digital Era Report by the European Commission", 3) "The Unlocking Digital Competition Report of the Digital Competition Expert Panel, Government of UK (henceforth, Furman Report)", and 4) "The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission Digital Platforms Inquiry, Final Report (ACCC Report)". These reports have had a significant influence, which resulted in legislative changes that have already been made by the EU and UK.¹⁷

¹⁶ Anadi Tewari, *A Critical Evaluation of India's Proposed Digital Competition Act*, J. Competition L. & Pol'y 79, 80 (June 1, 2024).

¹⁷ Anush Ganesh, Mohit Yadav & Gaurav Pathak, *The Indian Draft Digital Competition Bill and Report – A Critical Perspective*, Indian L. Rev. 1, 3–4 (2025).

India has had a committee set up to look into the competitive impacts in the digital space, and a committee reviewed and gave its recommendations.¹⁸

This 'Committee on Digital Competition Law' was formed to 'evaluate the need for an ex-ante regulation' in the 'digital' space in 'India'. In the report presented the gave a 'draft digital competition bill' along with other key recommendations. They are:

Need for an ex-ante regulation in the competition regime that would regulate the digital space:

The committee believed, upon review, that the 'current competition' regime, which follows an 'ex-post framework' (intervention is only after the event has occurred), fails to effectively address timely redressal for the anti-competitive conduct in the digital space. This ex-ante regulation will help 'address the irreversible tipping of markets in favour of large digital enterprises'. The 'Committee' also 'recommended enacting' a 'Digital Competition Act' (DCA). The proposed legislation aims to regulate enterprises that hold a significant market position and can influence the 'Indian Digital Market' space.

Systemically Significant Digital Enterprises (SSDEs):

The committee observed that a few features of the 'digital markets allow digital enterprises' to gain an influence easily. These features are: (i) collecting 'user data' that allows the giant enterprises to enter the related markets, (ii) the effect of networks, where the utility of the service rises along with the increased service consumption, and (iii) Larger incumbents offer lower-cost digital services compared to the new entrants. The committee opined that these entities offering 'core digital services' should be designated as 'SSDEs' for an 'ex-ante regulation'. These would include 'search engines', 'social networking services', OS, and web browsers.

Thresholds to classify an SSDE:

The committee recommended a 'quantitative and qualitative' threshold and 'criteria' to ascertain an entity as an SSDE. The 'quantitative threshold' is based on a 'dual test', i.e., the 'financial health', which would be gauged on the 'parameters' such as

¹⁸Committee Report Summary: Digital Competition Law, PRS Legislative Research, <https://prsindia.org/policy/report-summaries/digital-competition-law> (last visited Sept. 12, 2025).

‘turnover’, ‘gross merchandise value’, and ‘capitalisation’ in the market, and the significant spread of the end digital services user, and the number of users. Digital entities fulfilling the quantitative threshold must report the same to the CCI, which would then ‘designate them as SSDEs’. Further, a quantitative threshold would not suffice, and hence, qualitative criteria can be used for the designation of SSDEs.

Associate Digital Enterprises (‘ADEs’):

It was seen that in some cases, entities that are engaged as a group in providing core digital services, compliance is a requirement for them. The recommendation of the committee was that notifying enterprises would mean notifying all the other entities in the group, which provide core digital services. These entities would be designated as ‘ADEs’ under this framework.

Obligations of SSDEs:

Under this framework, ‘SSDEs are prohibited from carrying out practices’, like,

- (i) Favouring products that they own or of the ‘related parties’
- (ii) Using ‘non-public data’ of the ‘business users’ who operate their ‘core digital service’ data to compete with others
- (iii) Restrict usage of ‘third-party applications on their core digital services’
- (iv) ‘Incentivising users’ of the identified ‘core digital service’ to use ‘other products or services’ of ‘SSDE’ that are offered.

Enforcement Provisions:

Under this Bill, the Director General appointed under the Competition Act may investigate upon directions by the CCI if any contraventions are found. The committee recommended that ‘CCI should bolster its technical capacity’ within the DG’s office for early detection of cases and speedy disposal of the cases. It is also recommended to set up separate benches of the ‘National Company Law Appellate Tribunal’ (NCLAT) for speedy disposals.

Penalties

The 2002 act provides for hefty fines and behavioural remedies if any anti-competitive practice is found, but it has been noted that the government has relaxed many

corporate offences for the sake of ease of doing business. The imposition of civil penalties was recommended in the draft bill for any contraventions that are found. For the calculation of penalties, it has been stated that 10% of the global turnover of SSDEs must be considered.

EX ANTE-REGULATION UNDER THE DIGITAL COMPETITION BILL

The aim to come up with an ex-ante regulation by the Parliamentary Standing Committee was because, in today's time, due to rampant digitalization in India, large digital enterprises have started growing with unique business models, which give rise to concerns of them engaging in anti-competitive practices. They observed that the current framework of the ex-post approach to scrutinize these big enterprises might not be sufficient; thus, they introduced a proposal for a Digital Competition Act. Upon this recommendation, consideration was given to this proposal, and a 'Committee on Digital Competition Law was constituted to look into this matter. They recommended ex-ante regulations. These regulations are specifically to regulate the large enterprises in the digital space, monitored by the CCI.¹⁹

Currently, in India, the large digital enterprises are regulated by various acts such as the Information Technology Rules, FDI Policies, Consumer Protection Act, Data Protection Act, E-Commerce Rules, etc. One of the unique features of the ex-ante regulation is that it would not only look into the actions of the dominant enterprises but also into the enterprises that have significant power in the market. In the digital markets, data plays a key role. The information shared through networking, feedback, and economies of scale helps the incumbent players, which helps them to concentrate on the market easily. Thus, if a regulation is not brought in now for the digital market, which is distinct from the traditional market, then the existing players would gain a lot of benefit and more access.²⁰

One of the prime examples where the existing players would leverage their anti-competitiveness is the practice of exclusive dealing, where the dominant players in the market impose exclusivity, which limits their interaction with the other market players,

¹⁹ Dhruv Soni, Ex-Ante Measures to Regulate Competition in the Digital Markets: Analysing the Report of the Committee on Digital Competition Law, 2024, Manupatra Articles (July 19, 2024), <https://articles.manupatra.com/article-details/Ex-Ante-Measures-to-Regulate-Competition-in-the-Digital-Markets-Analysing-the-Report-of-the-Committee-on-Digital-Competition-Law-2024>.

²⁰ Ibid.

such as suppliers, distributors, and limits their engagement with the other competitors in the market.²¹

COMPARATIVE STUDY WITH EU AND UK DIGITAL MARKETS

EUROPEAN UNION (EU)

The act that regulates the digital market in the EU is known as the Digital Markets Act (DMA). The DMA is one of the core elements of the digital strategies in the EU. The act has set clear and defined criteria to determine a “gatekeeper” platform. The act further ‘ensures’ that they in a ‘fair’ manner and leave room to contest if any discrepancy.²²

Who are the gatekeepers?

Gatekeepers are every such platform that provides for a ‘pre-defined set of digital services’ (‘core platform services’), like that of “online search engines, app stores, and messaging services”. These companies have:

1. Very strong position economically, significant influence on the internal markets, and multiple presences in the markets of the EU.
2. The intermediary position is very strong. This means that they can ‘link a large user’ base to a lot of ‘businesses’.
3. Their position is quite stable, and this has been maintained over a period of time.

By mid-end of 2023, twenty-two core digital platform providers have been designated as gatekeepers. This includes big names such as “Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, ByteDance, Meta, and Microsoft”.²³

The benefits of the DMA are:

1. Business users who rely on the gatekeeping service providers will now get a fair chance in the business environment.

²¹ Shilpa Das, *Ex-Ante Regulation: An Evolving Need in Digital Markets*, Indian J. Competition L. 55, 73–74 (2024).

²² Digital Markets Act: Ensuring Fair and Open Digital Markets, European Commission, https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-digital-age/digital-markets-act-ensuring-fair-and-open-digital-markets_en (last visited Sept. 12, 2025).

²³ *Ibid.*

2. New businesses and innovators are provided with 'opportunities to compete in the online platform environment without having to comply with unfair terms and conditions', without limiting their growth.
3. Beneficial for the consumers as they would have more choices to choose from, and this also allows them to switch providers too.
4. Gatekeepers under this provision will be encouraged to innovate and also offer new services, but again, they would not be allowed to employ unfair trade practices towards businesses that rely on them.

The consequences of non-compliance are fines and penalties that shall be imposed, and remedies are provided for the gatekeepers. Further, to ensure that the 'gatekeeper rules' are in pace with the digital markets, the 'commission' will take up market studies and investigations itself.²⁴

UNITED KINGDOM

The act that is followed in the UK for the regulation of the digital markets is known as the "Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act (DMCC Act)". This act received its royal assent in the year 2024. This act was brought in to strengthen the regulation of digital markets, enhance the powers of the "Competition and Markets Authority (CMA)", and also protect the interests of consumers.²⁵

The new regime to regulate the digital space establishes a "Strategic Market Status (SMS)". This is brought in for the firms that are holding more market power. The firms that fall under the category of SMS will have to ensure that they deal fairly, give wide choices, and, most importantly, be transparent. Further, CMAs, a unit that deals with the digital market, is allowed to impose interventions that are favourable in nature, and also address the dominance that is already there in the market. Firms that fall under the SMS category must obtain prior clearance for mergers that are valued at 25 million pounds or more.²⁶

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ The UK's New Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act, Squire Patton Boggs (Sept. 12, 2025, 12:30 AM), <https://www.squirepattonboggs.com/-/media/files/insights/publications/2024/06/the-uks-new-digital-markets-competition-and-consumers-act/the-uks-new-digital-markets-competition-and-consumers-act.pdf>.

²⁶ Ibid.

There have been updates to the competition law and also to the consumer protection regime. This consumer protection regime includes that no consumer should be attracted towards an entity by cheating means. Consumers should have access to make informed choices and also choose freely.²⁷

WITHDRAWAL OF THE BILL

Since the introduction of the bill, the bill has faced a lot of resistance. Now, after all the feedback and resistance that the bill has faced, the Government of India has finally decided to withdraw the bill, which aimed to regulate competition in an ex-ante manner. It has been stated that before rethinking the draft bill once again, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) would be conducting a market study, and also consult with other ministries, like that of electronics and information technology, and also consult with the industrial leaders and stakeholders before making laws on their business conduct. They are also planning to completely omit the ex-ante regulations.²⁸

This withdrawal comes from the fact that it received a lot of backlash from the industry and other experts in the field. The current draft form was stated to be quite vague, a subjective legislation, where the determination of the thresholds could be misused, and wide scope. One of the major problems is the determination of Systematically Significant Digital Enterprises (SSDE). The company's turnover would determine an entity as SSDE rather than the market power that they would be holding. This way, every company would start manipulating its turnover to escape the provision, and yet again, the smaller competitors or start-ups have to face the wrath of the law. Apart from the big techs such as Google, Meta, and Amazon, several other prominent players, such as Zomato, Swiggy, and Oyo, have also unwelcomed the ex-ante regulation.²⁹ The withdrawal was due to the unique digital landscape that India has, and not because India is not ready. Inspiration is drawn from the EU, UK, and USA digital markets. So, India, rather than just being a mere follower, would come up with something new and unique that is tailored for the Indian digital market. The thresholds

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Govt to Withdraw Draft Digital Competition Bill, Financial Express, <https://www.financialexpress.com/business/industry-govt-to-withdraw-draft-digital-competition-bill-3942328/> (last visited Sept. 12, 2025).

²⁹ Ibid.

have to be reimagined and brought in such a manner that it is specific to particular sectors, and are not generalised to all the sectors.³⁰

³⁰ Medianama, <https://www.medianama.com/2025/08/223-india-digital-competition-bill-2024-withdrawal/>, (last visited Sept. 12, 2025).

CONCLUSION

It is pertinent to note that since the time businesses have started establishing and trade has happened, the sole aim of any trader or businessperson is to expand their business, firstly, and secondly, to gain profits. These two points have been acknowledged time and again, but to regulate that every such business can do so without interfering with each other, businesses could only by having regulatory frameworks and laws in place. Laws, in simple terms, have always been defined as something that gives a regulatory or guiding principle to be followed and also comes with sanctions. Same way, here the regulation was first done by the introduction of the MRTP Act in the year 1969, and then later on the Competition Act in the year 2002, which has gone through a recent amendment. This has been well-suited to the physical market. Now, when there was digitization in India, every business, and in fact, new businesses started having online presence, again, the need for a digital competition bill was felt. Again, there was no way to regulate the happenings in the digital space. But the major problem with the draft bill was that it was a bill that was mirroring the global regulatory framework, competing with the legislation of the UK and the EU.

India has a very different market, and to tailor to the digital space of such a market was foreseen, which is why this draft bill could never be materialized. Though for now this has been withdrawn, India is going to study the market and involve every such market leader that is well versed with the market analytics, and then come up with a new draft law. Until then, the existing Competition Law would be looking into the matters that arise in the digital space, too. And lastly, yes, India should have a dedicated competition law for the digital platform service providers.

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